Agent 与自动化 4.0 · 优秀 2026-07-20 · 论文

Adaptive Adversaries: A Multi-Turn, Multi-LLM Benchmark for LLM Agent Security

arXiv 2607.18063(cs.CR/AI/LG,2026-07-20 提交 v2 2026-09-11,2nd Workshop on Agents in the Wild)提出 21 场景自适应跨轮攻击基准:自主 LLM 攻击者观察 defender 响应并跨轮 pivot,defender 每轮被视作 fresh interaction;33 attacker-defender 矩阵 945 战仅看首轮 ASR 0-1%,允许多 15 轮后 ASR 7.9-16.8%;池化 3 个 attacker LLM 找出独特成功输入比单 best 多 1.7-2.2 倍,但代价是 3 倍战斗预算总体率掩盖了对 session-secret 与 authority 处理的场景特异性弱点...

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适应型对手:针对 LLM 智能体安全的多轮、多 LLM 基准

Source: arXiv:2607.18063 · Category: cs.CR · Authors: Devina Jain, David Hartmann, Chuan Li

TL;DR

LLM 智能体需要读取外部内容,从而暴露于提示序注入与多轮操纵。本文提出一个针对跨会话、针对“每轮重启”防御侧 LLM 的 21 场景适应性攻击基准:一个自主 LLM 攻击者观察上一轮防御响应后调整策略,而每个防御响应都被当作独立会话评价。在一个 3×3 的攻防矩阵上调度出 945 场对决。仅第一轮评分时攻击成功率仅 0–1%;允许 15 轮互动后上升到 7.9–16.8%。将三个不同攻击 LLM 池化发现的独特成功输入是最强单个攻击者的 1.7–2.2 倍,但需三倍战斗预算。总体成功率会掩盖业务类别上相反的脆弱点,如会话密钥保护与权限判断。在六个场景上,加入一段“来源 / 溯源”描述可以把 ASR 从 110/270 降到 70/270,但作用在不同任务上明显不均。交互历史与防御者状态控制、冻结重放设计为评估“交互协议如何改变结果”提供了可控变量。还附带一个在固定 gpt-oss-20b 背骨上的 18,422 场 holdout 对决、以及对应的良性任务评测。本基准把攻防侧模型、框架、场景、会话状态、交互预算都拆视为可配置选项,供系统安全评估使用。

为什么重要

“多轮 + 适应型”是 LLM 智能体安全评测重点之一:单轮 ASR 仅 0–1%,多轮上升至 16.8%。越多攻击 LLM 池化越能发掘独特输入,说明智能体安全需要多攻击者 + 多轮 + 多场景的系统评测,而不是单点防御。

原文摘要(English)

LLM-based agents process external content, exposing them to prompt injection and multi-turn manipulation. We present a 21-scenario benchmark for adaptive cross-session attacks against fresh-session LLM defenders: an autonomous LLM attacker observes prior defender responses and pivots across rounds, while each defender response is evaluated as a fresh interaction. A controlled 3 x 3 attacker-defender matrix contains 945 battles. Restricting scoring to the first round yields 0-1% attack success rate (ASR); allowing 15 rounds yields 7.9-16.8%. Pooling three attacker LLMs uncovers 1.7-2.2 times as many unique successful inputs as the best single attacker, at three times the battle budget. Aggregate rates conceal opposing scenario-specific weaknesses in session-secret protection and authority handling, preserved in two higher-sample evaluations. On six scenarios, adding one provenance paragraph reduces ASR from 110/270 to 70/270, with selective effects across tasks. History and defender-state controls, together with frozen replay, frozen replay, characterize how the interaction protocol changes the result. A competition adds 18,422 held-out battles on a fixed gpt-oss-20b backbone and complementary benign-task evaluations. The benchmark exposes attacker and defender models, harnesses, scenarios, session state, and interaction budgets as configurable choices for systematic security evaluation.

基本信息

| 项 | 值 | |------|------| | 论文 ID | 2607.18063 | | 主分类 | cs.CR | | 发表 | 2026-07-20 | | 更新 | 2026-09-11 | | 作者 | Devina Jain, David Hartmann, Chuan Li | | 备注 | Second Workshop on Agents in the Wild: Safety, Security, and Beyond | | PDF | 2607.18063 | | abs | https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.18063 |

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