Resourced Authority A Mechanism-Design Model for Participatory Governance of Deployed AI Agents

论文给出 deployed AI agents 的连续参与式治理机制设计模型：利益相关者在治理周期内通过 governance currency 表达支持或拒绝，funding aggregator 转换为 breadth-weighted support，经双阈值与 hysteresis 形成授权，再通过受安全上限约束的 coupling map 释放 metered compute budget作者把 signed compute license 作为硬件执行形态，并指出被治理 agent 操纵治理选民是核心开放问题

Resourced Authority A Mechanism-Design Model for Participatory Governance of Deployed AI Agents

Source: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06353

PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.06353v1

Content fetched: 2026-08-09T04:20:50.800307+00:00

Grounding: OpenCLI arXiv metadata and abstract

Metadata

Author(s): Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Ganesh Ghalme
Original date: 2026-08-06
Platform: arxiv
AAIF quality score: 4
Primary category: cs.GT
Categories: cs.GT, cs.AI, cs.MA
Comment: 22 pages, 9 Figures

中文摘要

English Summary

The paper models participatory governance of deployed AI agents as a mechanism that turns stakeholder support or rejection into bounded compute authorization. A two-threshold gate with hysteresis releases metered compute via a coupling map and signed compute license, while the authors identify manipulation of the governing electorate by the governed agent as the central open problem.

Intake Rationale

Deployed AI agent governance can use authorization gates as the enforceable control surface.

Source Metadata

arXiv ID: 2608.06353
Published: 2026-08-06
Updated: 2026-08-06
URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06353
PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.06353v1

Source Abstract

We give a formal mechanism design model for the continuous participatory governance of a deployed AI agent. The mechanism is built on the principle that governance should control an AI agent through resource allocation so as to make authorization self enforcing via compute budgets. The mechanism seeks to establish the Safe AI paradigm that compute is an effective governance lever. We situate our work as a compliance or commons overlay on a deployer. One governance period is an extensive form game in which verified human stakeholders arrive sequentially and contribute, on a provision or a rejection market, in a governance currency that is deliberately distinct from the agents compute. A funding aggregator turns raw contributions into breadth weighted effective supports - a two threshold gate with hysteresis converts net support into a binary authorization that, through a coupling map bounded by an exogenously certified safety ceiling, releases a metered compute budget - realized in hardware as a signed compute license so that the decision is self-enforcing. We characterize the class of agents the mechanism can govern and isolate manipulation of the governing electorate by the governed agent as the central open problem. We also introduce several challenges addressing manipulation of governing electorate by the governed agents.